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Abstract
Existing studies on information technology outsourcing relationships have typically examined partnership
factors that influence IT outsourcing effectiveness. This research extends such studies and draws upon
relational exchange theory to investigate how relational elements in service level agreements (SLAs) may
impact outsourcing relationships. The results show that the effects of a well-structured SLA in managing IT
outsourcing relationship are significant. This paper also provides insight into the development of relational
governance through a contractual mechanism over the entire course of an outsourcing engagement.
Suggestions for appropriate SLA elements are also developed.
Keywords:  IT outsourcing relationships, service level agreements, PLS
Introduction
As information technology outsourcing embraces significant IT activities that pervade organizational processes, most recent
practices have started to put more emphasis on managing the outsourcing relationship during the entire course of the partnership.
An example that exemplifies current trends and needs of the industry is that of Merrill Lynch, who signed a billon dollar deal with
an all-star team of vendors, and one general contractor that is responsible for forming and managing a trusted partnership (Datz
2003). A recent report by Gartner, however, points out that many firms have failed to build a skills base to meet the new challenge
of managing their outsourcing environment and are, therefore, at risk of a low return on service value (Scardino 2002).
One literature review reveals that research interests in IT outsourcing have just started to focus on issues of relationship
management (Lee et al. 2003). Most prior IT outsourcing research has focused on identifying determinants and partnership quality
as well as their impact on outsourcing success (Lee and Kim 1999). Most literature focuses on the fact that a favorable partnership,
present at the initiation of an engagement, grows over time, but has largely ignored how to foster and manage necessary attributes
of partner relationships that promote partnership quality. Therefore, ongoing management is required to build, maintain, and assure
long-term favorable relationships (Newman and Sabherwal 1996). This raises the underlying question that we address in this
paper:  How can organizations foster appropriate relationships that characterize favorable behaviors in IT outsourcing
engagements? In an effort to fill this gap, we explore mechanisms for developing favorable exchange relationships between the
service recipient (SR) and service provider (SP) in IT outsourcing from the SR’s perspective.
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1Relational norms are based on the expectation of mutuality of interest, essentially prescribing stewardship behavior, and are designed to
enhance the wellbeing of the relationship as a whole.  This will be captured through three sub-constructs suggested by prior literature:
flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity.
2Commitment refers to an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity between exchange partners. Typically the notion of commitment
connotes solidarity and cohesion, but these synonyms are vague. Here, we consider three measurable criteria of commitment: inputs, durability,
and consistency proposed by Kumar et al. (1995)
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Prior research on interorganizational relationships has argued that relational governance may develop from formal contracts
(Poppo and Zenger 2002). This paper extends the prior research to explore the roles service level agreements (SLAs) play in IT
outsourcing arrangements as a way of promoting relational governance. In line with the findings of existing research, we believe
that the appropriate attributes of relational governance may have positive impacts on the IT outsourcing performance overall. The
next section describes characteristics of SLAs in IT outsourcing relationships. Subsequently, we develop a research model and
hypotheses. Then, the research methodology, including data collection and the statistical analysis is described in detail. The
discussion and conclusion of this study are presented. 
Governance of IT Outsourcing Relationship and Relational Exchange Theory
A review of the IT outsourcing literature reveals that two prevailing perspectives underlie most research in IT outsourcing
relationships:  an economic view and a partnership view.  The economic view is approached using transaction cost economics
(TCE) or agency cost theory (Ang and Straub 1998). It suggests drawing complex contracts that define remedies for foreseeable
contingencies or specify processes for resolving unforeseeable outcomes in response to known exchange hazards such as
uncertainty or asset specificity (Williamson 1991).  The partnership view argues that the uncertainty surrounding IT outsourcing
arrangements demands a relationship that provides the flexibility and collaborative benefit of a partnership. Thus, it tends to focus
primarily on the process and behavior in managing relationships based on trust and societal enforcement (Lee and Kim 1999).
It is important to note that the notion of partnership cannot be divorced from the elements of contracts (Fitzgerald and Willcocks
1994). In many interorganizational relationships, contracts primarily serve to define the tone and the nature of the relationship
(Hui and Beath 2002) and contracts or direct control are necessary to serve as a safety net (Sabherwal 1999). In this regard, Poppo
and Zenger (2002) found that formal contracts and relational governance function complementarily where managers appeared
to couple their increasingly customized contracts with a high level of relational governance. Further, a review of prior literature
also hints that partner relationship attributes can be built through contractual means (Kern and Willcocks 2002). Well-specified
contracts might promote more cooperative, long-term, trusting exchange relationships. Yet, managing a relationship from a
contract perspective has been largely downplayed (Kern and Willcocks 2002). 
The relational exchange theory (RET) contends that the governance of interorganizational exchanges involves more than formal
contracts. Interorganizational exchanges are typically repeated exchanges embedded in social relationships, which are called
relational (Macneil 1980). In this research stream, Macneil (1980) developed a multidimensional typology of business exchange
that differentiated from transactional or discrete, traditional, arm’s length business exchanges. In relational exchange, the
relationship is a critical governance mechanism and, therefore, relational exchange requires a relationship that has high levels of
such relational attributes as relational norms1 (Heide and John 1992; Kern and Blois 2002) and commitment2 (Lawler and Yoon
1996; Morgan and Hunt 1994) that help govern the exchange. According to the transaction cost literature, contracts also provide
customized approaches and mutually agreed upon policies and procedures for dealing with necessary adaptations in an exchange
(Williamson 1991). This complementary relationship may also function in reverse, generating contractual refinements that further
support greater relational attributes. Thus, researchers of RET have attempted to pinpoint relationship attributes that must exist
to ensure relational exchange behaviors (Dwyer et al. 1987; Lambe et al. 2000). Drawing upon RET, this paper aims to explore,
and extend where appropriate, the complementarities of key conclusions from two streams of research within the specific context
of IT outsourcing arrangements. 
Model and Hypotheses
Practitioners often proclaim that the key to managing sourcing relationships are the service level agreements (SLAs). An SLA
is defined as a formal written agreement developed jointly between the service recipient (SR) and the service provider (SP) that
Goo et al./Management of IT Outsourcing Relationships
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specifies a product or service to be provided at a certain level so as to meet business objectives (Sturm et al. 2000). As a part of
the outsourcing contract, SLAs are drafted as a specific way to efficiently manage outsourcing relationships. SLAs in IT
outsourcing have played an important role in cultivating favorable sourcing relationships according to the popular press in that
SLAs form the initial contract where both parties define and understand the goals, the responsibilities of each party, and how to
handle difficult challenges together, thus drawing sourcing engagements toward a trust-based partnership (Singleton et al. 1988).
While the popular press provides conjectures and anecdotal evidence concerning the importance of SLAs in IT outsourcing
(Matlus and Brittain 2002), no empirical study has yet investigated the role of SLAs in the development of favorable relationships
between the SR and the SP. 
We propose 11 relational elements of SLAs or seeds that will help in fostering an intended relational contract. When a challenge
arises during the contract period, it prompts the need for a deeper level of cooperation or collaboration through the parties’
communication and involvement. Thus, the relationship can be restructured and realigned based on evolving interests and trust.
Indeed, the IT outsourcing relationship might become more relational as exchange contingencies and duties become less
codifiable. Based on the relational contract identified by Macneil (1980), a template of relational SLAs under study is developed
in this paper and further refined based on a review of (1) determinants or issues that have been previously discussed in partnership
literature and (2) the fundamental constituents in SLAs suggested by the Gartner Group (Stone 2001). Appendix A summarizes
the characteristics of those relational elements within the context of relational exchanges as compared to discrete transactions that
are limited in capacity to develop relationship-based governance over time
These 11 elements are categorized into 3 major dimensions:  foundation, change management, and governance characteristics.
Foundation characteristics in SLAs deal with the ground rules for future exchanges. This builds a spirit of agreement and
ownership of the functional exchange among those entities involved with its development (Singleton et al. 1988). This also helps
decision makers who actually deal with contracts to understand and share the intent of the creation of the relationship. It sets clear
standards of conduct by defining what the SR and SP are obligated to deliver and at what cost. Change management
characteristics address uncertainty (e.g., clauses for agreeing to agree). Because the IT environment evolves rapidly and business
conditions often require a fast response by the SP to deliver new services or modify current services, a change management plan
is a critical dimension in SLAs. These ensure that the SP will deliver valuable inputs to the SR and strengthen the SR/SP
relationship when constructing contractual and service level definitions that are unrealistic in situations of increasing uncertainty.
Governance characteristics provide a way to harmonize the relationship through a clear statement of measurements, the
communication channel and method, conflict arbitration, and penalties and rewards. A way to ensure that the relationship remains
on course is to continually assess the value that the relationship is creating for the various stakeholders. These three dimensions
become the skeleton for the SLA structure to assure positive SR–SP relationships. 
Consistent with the RET, we argue that attributes such as relational norms and commitment are key governance mechanisms in
IT outsourcing arrangements that might serve as a “companion working spirit” (Koh et al. 1999). We believe that these attributes
of psychological protocols in relationships are antecedents of appropriate relational behaviors in functional exchanges of an
outsourcing relationship. In addition, relational attributes may be nurtured through ongoing exchanges guided by the relational
elements of SLAs. For example, well-specified contracts narrow the domain and severity of risk to which an exchange is exposed
and thereby promote norms of flexibility, solidarity, and information sharing. Such relational norms may function to mitigate the
precise exchange hazards (e.g., unforeseeable contingencies, measurement difficulty) by heightening the probability that trust and
cooperation will safeguard against hazards poorly protected by the SLAs and thereby lead to the resultant behavior. Moreover,
consummated exchanges anchored at the SLAs give parties an “emotional buzz” in much the same way as jointly accomplishing
a task with another fosters perceptions of relational cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 1996), durability, and consistency in exchange.
These perceptions of commitment mediate the impact of structured relational elements of SLAs on commitment behaviors. Thus,
we have introduced an intervening psychological link between formal SLAs and relational behaviors. 
Based on the RET framework, Figure 1 depicts the research model that is to investigate how the relational elements in SLAs may
boost the success of outsourcing relationships. The relational attributes such as relational norms and commitment can be cultivated
through well-structured three-dimensional views of SLAs embedded in the relational exchange. This synergism may help shape
favorable behaviors in outsourcing arrangements such as conflict resolution, trusting behavior, and mutual dependence by
overcoming the adaptive limits of contracts:  a bilateral commitment to keep-on-with-it despite unexpected conflicts. The
hypothesized relationships in this model and the underpinnings are detailed below.
Goo et al./Management of IT Outsourcing Relationships
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Figure 1.  Research Model
Relational Attributes
Relational Norms 
In business relationships, relational norms are “expectations of mutuality of interest, essentially prescribing stewardship behavior,
and are designed to enhance the well-being of the relationship as a whole” (Heide and John 1992). As the relational norms
between the SR and the SP stabilize and increase, the parties would be better able to expect patterns of stewardship behaviors in
a relationship. With the high level of relational norms, the SR could expect that the SP would use its own judgment to find the
combination of resources that best meets the SR’s need at the lowest cost although the circumstances may cause deviation from
the specified agreements in the contract. Therefore, IT outsourcing appears to heavily rely on mechanisms that could help develop
relational norms very early in the life of the relationship (Kern and Blois 2002). While the IT outsourcing industry has developed
norms that define general expectations of roles and practices of the industry players under a normal outsourcing arrangement over
a decade, the general norms need to be further fine-grained to fit within the context of a specific outsourcing engagement. The
client firm can strengthen and promote the development of relational norms by specifying positive action principles as the basis
for possible norms as they occur and then communicating these expectations to the SP. 
Foundation characteristics encapsulate what these parties believe to be the characteristics of a successful partnering relationship.
Clarifying the objectives of both parties and process ownership through SLAs in the engagement will facilitate the expectation
of proactive information exchange and solidarity in the relationship to develop appropriate norms. Change management schemes
in SLAs would foster parties’ bilateral expectations of willingness to make adaptations as circumstances change. These
expectations may enhance the contractual solidarity that places a high value on the relationship. Governance characteristics entail
careful monitoring of services, reinforcement, and regular revisiting of the contract for updates to guide the SR to move together
with the SP toward standardization of interactions and routine operations. The standardization becomes the expected pattern of
behavior. For example, psychological reinforcements using reward or penalty help partners expedite the norm development
Goo et al./Management of IT Outsourcing Relationships
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process. Thus, we argue that SLAs that reflect these three characteristics of relational elements could influence the future
promotion of relational norms. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1a: Foundation characteristics of SLAs directly and positively influence the relational norms in IT
outsourcing relationships. 
Hypothesis 1b: Change management characteristics of SLAs directly and positively influence the relational norms
in IT outsourcing relationships.
Hypothesis 1c: Governance characteristics of SLAs directly and positively influence the relational norms in IT
outsourcing relationships.
Commitment
While commitment arises as early as the selection of the vendor and then becomes formalized with the signing of the contract
in outsourcing practices, commitment should evolve to a major factor in maintaining exchange relationships (Newman and
Sabherwal 1996). In this study, commitment refers to an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity between exchange
partners (Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995). We posit that a way to promote commitment over time is through the use of relational
elements of SLAs. For instance, developing a psychological congruence of obligation (Koh et al. 1999) and relational cohesion
(Lawler and Yoon 1996) through foundation characteristics (service-level objectives, process ownership, and service-level
contents) helps parties to become more deeply involved in the relationship through the investment of capital and effort. Given
the specific components of change management in SLAs such as an innovation plan or a demand management plan, the parties
can bond themselves to encourage their continued investment in the relationship. Indeed, pressure to adjust rather than dissolve
a relationship arises from the ongoing benefits accruing to each partner. These benefits include certainty from mutually anticipated
levels of service, efficiency stemming from innovation, and exchange effectiveness that accrues from incentives. Measurement
charts and reporting procedures in the communication plan might help parties maintain the vigilance, where open revelation of
needs (e.g., an adjustment of requirements and performance) and resources related to the future of the relationship are made to
the relationship. Such transparent exchanges may help the parties to mitigate the uncertainty, which, in turn, encourages parties
to remain in the relationship. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2a: Foundation characteristics of SLAs directly and positively influence commitment in IT outsourcing
relationships. 
Hypothesis 2b: Change management characteristics of SLAs directly and positively influence commitment in IT
outsourcing relationships.
Hypothesis 2c: Governance characteristics of SLAs directly and positively influence commitment in IT outsourcing
relationships.
Relational Behaviors
Conflict Resolution
Conflict resolution refers to the extent to which parties achieve mutually satisfying resolution of their conflicts and disagreements
are replaced by agreement and consensus (Macneil 1980; Robey et al. 1989). As identified by Druckman et al. (1988), differences
in values and interests play a central role in a wide variety of conflicts and their resolution is suggested through improved
communication and understanding of the shared goals. We emphasize the functional benefits of these relational attributes toward
successful resolution of conflict. Norms are the lubricants that keep relationships from being stymied by their contractual terms.
The norms or principles identified for this management structure provide the foundation for successful conflict resolution, the
standardization of escalation procedures, a critical review of past actions, and the stimulation of solidarity (Dwyer et al. 1987).
Kaufmann and Stern (1988) found that when a serious conflict occurs, the norms under which the exchange relationship generally
operates play an important role in determining the parties’ reactions to each other’s behavior during the dispute. Commitment
demands more frequent and effective communications between the parties and leads to demonstrate good faith in bargaining,
which will serve to deepen the relationship between SR and SP. Therefore
Goo et al./Management of IT Outsourcing Relationships
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Hypothesis 3a: Relational norms directly and positively influence conflict resolution in IT outsourcing relationships.
Hypothesis 3b: Commitment directly and positively influences conflict resolution in IT outsourcing relationships.
Trusting Behavior
Our conceptualization of trust in this study focuses on relational forms of trusting behavior that specifically pertain to the
counterpart in the dyad, where trusting behavior is likely to be based on experience and interaction with a particular exchange
partner (Zaheer et al. 1998). As conceptualized by Sabherwal (1999), identification-based trust in IT outsourcing follows from
two parties identifying with each other goals that could be nurtured through the norms of information exchange, where parties
can engender the mutual expectations about the proactive sharing of information. Indeed, trust takes time to develop (Lewicki
and Bunker 1996) and, in most cases, in IT outsourcing, trust evolves through the growth of a good track record for the
accomplishment of stipulated terms (Kern and Willcocks 2002). Thus, the critical issue of trust build-up is to create an
environment that insures that the SR and the SP behave in a fair manner and with favorable attitudes based on the norms
established and that their business interests are in alignment over the life of the relationship. The relational norm of solidarity
nurtures an environment of multilevel interactions between the firms, through mutual coordination and conscientious and honest
dealings with each other. The cultivation of this environment should be institutionalized through commitment that encourages
a pervasive mindset of a continuous relationship (McKnight et al. 1998). The commitment engendered in relational exchange will
provide a way for partners to safeguard themselves from opportunistic behaviors and will promote trusting behaviors. Therefore,
Hypothesis 4a: Relational norms directly and positively influence trusting behavior in IT outsourcing relationships.
Hypothesis 4b: Commitment directly and positively influences trusting behavior in IT outsourcing relationships.
Mutual Dependence
Mutual dependence is the recognition by both partners that outcomes obtained from the exchange relationships are greater than
those possible from other business alternatives (Dwyer et al. 1987). While dependency emerged as a byproduct of IT outsourcing,
maintaining mutual dependency was generally considered a difficult task because of an asymmetry of resources and an influence
on the power-control dichotomy over time (Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994). The SR and the SP attempt to influence a partner’s
decision making on a particular issue because each needs the other to in order to achieve their respective goals (Lee and Kim
1999). Literature on interorganizational relationships demonstrated that commitment to a relationship played an important role
in balancing power and equity in repetitive exchanges (Cook and Emerson 1978). Partners jointly expected fiduciary responsibility
in the performance of their roles and believed that each would act in the best interest of the partnership. Williamson (1991) argues
that the exchange of “hostages” (bilateral exchange of transaction-specific assets) is a way of ensuring commitment to the
relationship and communicating mutual dependence. Mutual dependence is also built as partners invest in the exchange
relationship, determine mutually compatible goals, and foresee positive mutual outcomes. These courses of mutual dependency
could be developed through relational norms of solidarity and information exchange, which has been fostered through relational
elements of SLAs. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5a: Relational norms directly and positively influence mutual dependency in IT outsourcing relationships.
Hypothesis 5b: Commitment directly and positively influences mutual dependency in IT outsourcing relationships.
Research Methodology
Data Collection
Data was collected in South Korea using questionnaires via the Web survey method. A list of IT professionals in 200 firms was
obtained from the attendee list of a national outsourcing conference, indicating that the sample frame represents a national
directory of the most senior IT managers in Korea. To improve the response rate, we adopted the total design method proposed
by Dillman (1978).  Pre-recruiting calls were made to the prospective respondents in order to explain the purpose of the study
and invite their participation in the study. We requested that the survey be forwarded to an executive (e.g., CIO, senior IT
Goo et al./Management of IT Outsourcing Relationships
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manager, procurement executive, contract manager, or the head of the IT outsourcing management team) who had been involved
in any IT outsourcing decision which had been implemented through SLAs with an external IT provider within the last 5 years.
A total of 150 professionals from the list agreed to participate in the survey themselves or to direct us to key informants who had
been involved in IT outsourcing arrangements using SLAs. An e-mail message containing the URL that linked to the Web-based
online survey instrument was sent to the 150 key informants from the selected firms. To increase the response rate, the
respondents were offered a chance to win financial incentives as well as a report that summarized the results of the study.  Of the
150 participants who agreed, 92 completed responses were received, representing a response rate of 61.3 percent. 
Demographic information about the respondents showed that about 46.8 percent were senior IT executives and 41 percent were
IT managers. Although some preliminary steps were taken to ensure proper selection of key informants, a formal check was
administered as part of the questionnaire (Kumar et al. 1993). Specifically, two items regarding key informant quality were used
to assess the informant’s knowledge about the SLAs chosen and the involvement with the IT outsourcing arrangements on a
seven-point scale. The mean score for informant quality for each item was 5.60 and 5.80 out of 7, respectively, indicating that
respondents were appropriate and thus all responses were retained.
Operationalization of Constructs 
All constructs in the survey were measured using multi-item scales with seven-point Likert rating systems. Three stages of the
instrument design were performed (Moore and Benbasat 1991):  (1) item creation, (2) scale development, and (3) instrument
testing. In the item creation, a conscientious effort was made to adapt existing validated measures of the research constructs from
established instruments. For the scale development, a panel of experts reviewed the instrument to ensure the content validity and
to identify ambiguous items of the instruments created in the first step. The scales for the adapted items used endpoints ranging
from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree.”  For the instrument testing, a pilot test was conducted prior to collecting data
for the field test. After analyzing the pilot responses, a number of minor revisions were made to the questionnaires, such as
clarifying terms, reordering questions, and removing instructions that the respondents found unnecessary. 
Eleven constructs of SLA elements.3  The new items for the 11 constructs of SLA elements were developed in this study based
on a review of prior literature on RET and interfirm relationships as well as input from outsourcing experts. Based on the premises
of RET, the operational definitions for each construct of the proposed elements of SLAs were generated. Three items were
developed for each construct to capture to what extent the specific elements were addressed in their SLAs using a scale ranging
from (1) “not at all” to (7) “very extensively.” 
Relational norms.  Because relational norms are indicative of a high-order construct dubbed relationalism (Heide and John 1992),
we captured three contracting norms of solidarity, flexibility, and information exchange as proposed by Heide and John.  The
measure used five items that tapped into the degree to which a client firm expected that parties would be willing to make
adaptations as circumstances change, proactively provide information useful to the partner, and that a high value was placed on
the relationship (Heide and John 1992). 
Commitment.  In order to capture the willingness of the parties to exert effort and devote resources to sustain an outsourcing
relationship, we considered three measurable criteria of commitment: inputs, durability, and consistency as proposed by Kumar
et al. (1995). The measure used seven items that assessed the extent to which the parties intended to become more deeply involved
in the outsourcing relationship through the investment of capital and effort, the parties’ desire to continue an outsourcing
relationship because of positive affect toward the partner (Meyer and Allen 1984), and the parties’ intention to remain in the
relationship, which reflected the relationship’s stability (Lee and Kim 1999).
Conflict Resolution.  The items were derived from Robey et al.’s (1989) measure for interpersonal conflict resolution in
information systems development. Items were adapted to an IT outsourcing context to assess the extent to which disagreements
between the SR and the SP were replaced by agreement and consensus.
Trusting Behavior.  The measure for trusting behavior was based on the conceptualization by Zaheer et al. (1998). Lee and Kim
(1999) adapted the trusting behavior measure in the context of outsourcing relationships to capture the degree to which the service
Goo et al./Management of IT Outsourcing Relationships
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provider would act predictably, fulfill its obligations, and behave fairly. Three items were used to measure the trusting behavior
between the SR and SP in the IT outsourcing engagements.
Mutual Dependence.  The measure was adapted from Lee and Kim to fit the context of this study. The final measure used three
items that measured the extent to which an organization influences a partner’s decision making.
Data Analysis
We used the partial least squares (PLS) approach of PLSGraph version 3.0 to assess our measurement model and then the
structural model. This technique is appropriate because of the existence of some formative constructs in our model and the
effectiveness of testing the model with a small sample size in this study (Chin 1998a). The conservative sample size requirements
for PLS models is 10 times either (1) the largest number of formative indicators in a block or (2) the largest number of
independent variables impacting a dependent variable, whichever is greater (Chin 1998b). Our sample size of 92 exceeded the
recommended minimum of 30, which was adequate for model testing. 
Each one of the constructs exhibited the needed internal consistency reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity
(Tables 1 and 2). The internal consistency reliability was checked by composite reliability (Fornell and Larcker 1981) as well as
Cronbach’s alpha, which was well above the recommended level of 0.7, indicating adequate internal consistency (Nunally 1978).
Content validity was examined through both convergent and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is adequate when
constructs have an average variance extracted (AVE) of at least 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker 1981) and when items load highly
(loading > 0.5) on their associated factors as well. Table 1 shows that reflective measures have significant loadings that are much
higher than the suggested threshold. For satisfactory discriminant validity, the AVE from the construct should be greater than the
variance shared between the construct and other constructs in the model (Chin 1998a). These items also demonstrated satisfactory
convergent and discriminant validity (see Table 2).
Table 1.  Summary of the Assessment of the Measurement Models
Constructs
# of
Items Alpha
Composite
Reliabilitya AVE Loadings (t-Statistics)*
Scales Adapted
from
Service Level Objectives 3 0.85 0.87 0.69 0.83 (12.25), 0.85 (9.68), 0.81 (8.03) New items
Process Ownership 3 0.90 0.92 0.79 0.92 (26.12), 0.88 (18.72), 0.87 (16.65) New items
Service Level 3 0.90 0.90 0.75 0.94 (49.81), 0.84 (21.31), 0.82 (17.06) New items
Future Demand 3 0.90 0.93 0.81 0.90 (23.50), 0.88 (23.87), 0.91 (30.38) New items
Anticipated Change 3 0.89 0.92 0.80 0.91 (27.56), 0.89 (16.93), 0.89 (23.54) New items
Planning of Innovation 3 0.88 0.89 0.74 0.73 (7.44), 0.94 (25.13), 0.89 (24.20) New items
Feedback Process 3 0.87 0.94 0.83 0.87 (16.38), 0.90 (11.57), 0.95 (34.91) New items
Communication Flow 3 0.90 0.92 0.80 0.93 (24.83), 0.88 (12.53), 0.86 (17.54) New items
Service Measurement 3 0.91 0.93 0.81 0.90 (20.97), 0.89 (20.35), 0.92 (30.66) New items
Conflict Arbitration 3 0.92 0.87 0.69 0.76 (7.17), 0.92 (21.71), 0.80 (9.61) New items
Coercing Penalty 3 0.87 0.88 0.71 0.96 (20.22), 0.81 (6.54), 0.73 (4.92) New items
Relational Norms 5 0.86 0.88 0.60 0.75 (9.94), 0.81 (20.15), 0.78 (17.28),0.75 (11.14), 0.77 (13.89)
Anderson and Narus
1990; Heide and John
1992; Kaufmann and
Stern 1988
Commitment 7 0.89 0.93 0.65
0.78 (16.63, 0.83 (22.83), 0.81 (18.19),
0.78 (17.68), 0.82 (16.91), 0.79 (19.30),
0.82 (16.91)
Meyer and Allen
1984; Mohr and Nevin
1990; Noordewier et
al. 1990
Conflict Resolution 3 0.85 0.91 0.77 0.89 (31.77), 0.90 (36.76), 0.87 (28.30) Robey et al. 1989
Trusting Behavior 3 0.81 0.89 0.72 0.90 (49.69), 0.86 (25.14), 0.78 (16.40) Lee and Kim 1999
Mutual Dependence 3 0.82 0.90 0.74 0.85 (26.83), 0.85 (24.88), 0.88 (26.67) Lee and Kim 1999
aFornell and Larcker’s (1981) internal consistency reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted; *p < 0.001
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Table 2.  Correlations of Latent Variables and Evidence of Discriminant Validity
SLO PO SL AC FD C RN PI FP CF SM CA CP CR TB MD
SLO 0.83
PO 0.52 0.89
SL 0.60 0.60 0.87
AC 0.35 0.55 0.51 0.90
FD 0.39 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.90
C 0.53 0.54 0.63 0.24 0.35 0.80
RN 0.34 0.48 0.50 0.20 0.24 0.67 0.77
PI 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.66 0.67 0.31 0.21 0.86
FP 0.44 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.69 0.41 0.29 0.61 0.91
CF 0.48 0.58 0.64 0.47 0.56 0.54 0.47 0.46 0.63 0.89
SM 0.53 0.57 0.70 0.40 0.62 0.58 0.46 0.50 0.64 0.69 0.90
CA 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.43 0.34 0.56 0.64 0.54 0.59 0.83
CP 0.25 0.43 0.44 0.21 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.43 0.31 0.32 0.84
CR 0.39 0.46 0.54 0.21 0.32 0.67 0.61 0.23 0.33 0.41 0.50 0.27 0.47 0.88
TB 0.45 0.44 0.52 0.22 0.21 0.62 0.64 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.70 0.85
MD 0.48 0.39 0.52 0.22 0.20 0.60 0.56 0.25 0.30 0.46 0.55 0.38 0.52 0.50 0.64 0.86
Note:  Bolded diagonal elements are the square root of average variance extracted (AVE).  
These values should exceed the inter-construct correlations (off-diagonal elements) for adequate discriminant validity.
SLO = Service Level Objectives; PO = Process Ownership; SL = Service Level; AC = Anticipated Change; FD = Future
Demand; C = Commitment;  RN = Relational Norm; PI = Planning of Innovation; FP = Feedback Process; CF =
Communication Flow; SM = Service Measurement; CA = Conflict Arbitration; CP = Coercing Penalty; CR = Conflict
Resolution; TB = Trusting Behavior; MD = Mutual Dependence
Having confirmed the psychometric properties of the 16 multi-item constructs in our model, the next step was to assess whether
the three second-order constructs—foundation, change management, and governance characteristics—were measured reliably
by the related first-order constructs. Three characteristics of SLAs were conceptualized as a second-order formative construct
measured by eleven constituent elements of SLAs. The weights of all 11 elements were statistically significant (see Figure 2).
The next step in testing the hypothesized model was to assess the relationships among various latent constructs in the PLS
structural model. The assessment of the structural model includes estimating path coefficients and R2.
Both the R2 and the path coefficients indicate how well the model is performing. A bootstrapping procedure with resampling of
500 subsamples was used to determine the statistical significance of the parameter estimates. Tests of individual hypotheses in
the model relied on an examination of the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance of the path coefficients in the structural
model.
All statistical tests were assessed at the 5 percent level of significance using one-tailed t-tests because our hypotheses were
unidirectional. A summary of these results is presented in Figure 2. The results show that the standardized path coefficients range
from 0.238 to 0.515 and R2 for endogenous variables range from 33 to 54 percent . Overall, the results provide strong support that
the augmented model predicts the possibility of cultivating a positive outsourcing relationship through SLAs. Thus, the fit of the
overall model is good. Findings support all hypotheses of the model (Figure 2). Foundation, change management, and governance
characteristics were all positively related to the relational norms and commitment, with significance at the p < 0.01 or lower level.
Respectively, 33 and 44 percent of the variances in relational norms and commitment were accounted for by these three second-
order constructs of SLA characteristics in the model.
Relational norms and commitment were all positively related to the conflict resolution, trusting behavior, and mutual dependence,
with significance at the p < 0.05 or lower level. Respectively, 54, 52, and 36 percent of the variances in conflict resolution,
trusting behavior, and mutual dependence were accounted for by these two relational attributes in the model.
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SLA Elements Characteristics
Relational
Attributes
Relational
Behaviors
Service Level Objectives
Process Ownership
Service Level Contents
Future Demand Mgmt
Anticipated Change
Planning of Innovation
Feedback Process
Communication
Measurement Charter
Conflict Arbitration
Enforcement
*p < 0.05 level;  *p < 0.01 level;  ***p < 0.001 level
Conflict
Resolution
Trusting
Behavior
Mutual
Dependence
R2 = 0.538
R2 = 0.523
R2 = 0.356
Relational
Norms
Commitment
Foundation
Change
Management
Governance
0.294**
0.400***
0.268**
0.238**
0.495***
0.474***
R2 = 0.440
R2 = 0.328
0.489***
0.248*
0.321**
0.287**
0.515***
0.314*
0.332***
0.412***
0.414***
0.304***0.277***
0.255**
0.30
3**
*
0.365***0.383***
0.273**
0.22
5**
*
Figure 2.  Model Results
Foundation, change management, and governance characteristics contributed positively and significantly to relational norms ($
= 0.294, p <0.01; $ = 0.268, p < 0.01; and $ = 0.495, p < 0.001, respectively), supporting hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. Similarly,
foundation, change management, and governance characteristics contributed positively and significantly to commitment ($ =
0.400, p < 0.001; $ = 0.238, p < 0.01; and $ = 0.474, p < 0.001, respectively), supporting hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. Relational
norms and commitment had significant and positive effects on conflict resolution ($ = 0.489, p < 0.001 and $ = 0.287, p < 0.01,
respectively), trusting behavior ($ =  0.248, p < 0.05 and $ = 0.515, p < 0.001, respectively), and mutual dependence ($ = 0.321,
p < 0.01 and $ = 0.314, p < 0.05, respectively). Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a, and 5b were supported.
Discussion and Conclusions
Combining the first-order construct weights, the PLS approach of structural equation modeling allowed for the examination of
the second-order constructs, providing insight as to which aspects of SLAs are particularly salient in the context of the
development of relational attributes. Overall, the results of this research provided good support for the argument that the
psychological state of relational attributes could be nurtured via SLAs, which in turn encouraged favorable behaviors between
the SR and the SP. This study empirically showed that the effects of well-structured SLAs in managing the IT outsourcing
relationship were significant. Path coefficients between the constructs indicated that all constituent elements of SLAs proposed
in this study were significant contributions to the relational attributes such as relational norms and commitment.
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Table 3.  Management Path Coefficients between Constructs
Relational Attributes Relational Attributes
Relational Norms Commitment Relational Norms Commitment
Characteristics 
of SLAs
Foundation 0.294 0.400
Relational 
Outcomes
Conflict 
Resolution 0.489 0.287
Change 
Management 0.268 0.238
Trusting
Behavior 0.248 0.515
Governance 0.495 0.474 Mutual Dependence 0.321 0.314
However, the difference in the magnitude of path coefficients between the constructs is interesting (see Table 3). Because the
model was run using standardized construct values, the beta values can be interpreted directly. For example, a 1 standard deviation
increase in specifying foundation characteristics in SLAs results in a 0.294 standard deviation increase in relational norms. Thus,
the results indicate that while the SLA elements that reflect foundation characteristics and change management characteristics
assist in nurturing the appropriate relational norms, the SLA elements that reflect governance characteristics may foster relational
norms more effectively than do the other characteristics of contractual elements.
The SLA elements that form foundation and governance characteristics may shape relational norms more effectively than do the
change management characteristics.  Furthermore, while both relational norms and commitment were shown to have successfully
assisted in governing the behaviors of the parties in the IT outsourcing engagement, the results showed that the effectiveness of
each attribute on three relational behaviors in the model were different. Specifically, the relational norms showed a stronger impact
on conflict resolution than the other two relational behaviors, indicating that as the parties developed the relational norms that
possess flexibility, solidarity, and effective information exchange between the SR and the SP, the relational norms helped the
parties to effectively handle the conflicts of interests that arose in the course of functional exchanges. On the other hand,
commitment emanating from relationship durability and consistency of input had more influence on inducing trusting behavior
of the parties in the outsourcing engagements. The underpinnings of this result could be explained by the current outsourcing
practices that were extended even to the strategically important IT activities for leveraging the unique skills and resources of the
other organization to the benefit of their companies. Given the change in businesses today, the SR and the SP seek to develop a
relationship out of their potential for a long-term fit. Therefore, if both parties were able to develop commitment in the ongoing
relationship, it would act to mitigate coordination disturbances and agency problems and encourage both parties to be reliable.
While there is a need for further theoretical refinement, elaboration, and the extension of the model, the different impacts of SLA
elements and relationship attributes to the behavioral outcomes in IT outsourcing indicate that the different sets of the elements
in SLAs can be composed within the diverse contexts of outsourcing engagements such as outsourcing objectives and institutional
environment. If this is confirmed through future studies, then it can lead to a more appropriate development of outsourcing
relationships with different contingencies.
In conclusion, the results of this study strongly support our argument that the relational elements in SLAs may boost the success
of outsourcing relationships by effectively nurturing favorable relationship attributes and behavioral outcomes. Existing studies
on IT outsourcing relationships typically examine the partnership factors that influence the IT outsourcing effectiveness and do
not effectively shed light on how to cultivate those factors to garner the benefits of IT outsourcing. The SLAs were proposed to
the model as a way to develop the relationship-based functional exchange in IT outsourcing practices. To practitioners, our results
suggest that organizational commitment in developing well-structured SLAs beforehand should ultimately pay off in the success
of IT outsourcing arrangements through the cultivation of positive relationships during the course of engagements. To academia,
this indicates both the viability of integrating an RET framework in the study of IT outsourcing relationships and the importance
of continued research in this direction. 
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Appendix A.  Relational Elements in SLAs Derived
from a Relational Exchange Perspective
Characteristics of Relational
Elements in SLAs Contractual Issues in RET Relational Exchange Discrete Transactions
Foundation
Characteristics
Service  Level
Objectives
Spirit of contractual solidarity
and regulation of exchange
behavior to ensure performance
Increased emphasis on legal and
self-regulation; psychological
satisfactions cause internal
adjustments
Governed by social norms,
rules, etiquette, and prospects
for self-gain
Process
Ownership Plan
Number of entities taking part in
some aspect of the exchange
process
Often more than two parties
involved in the process and
governance of exchange
Two parties
Service Level
Contents
Obligations in terms of three
aspects:  sources of content,
sources of obligation, and
specificity
Content and sources of
obligations are promises made
in the relation plus customs and
laws; obligations are
customized, detailed, and
administered within the relation
Content comes from offers and
simple claims, obligations come
from beliefs and customs
(external enforcement),
standardized obligations
Change
Management
Characteristics
Future Demand
Management
Plan
Planning the process and
mechanisms for coping with
change and contingencies
Significant focus on the process
of exchange; detailed planning
for the future exchange within
new environments and to satisfy
changing goals; tacit and
explicit assumptions abound
Primary focus o the substance of
exchange; no future is
anticipated
Anticipated
Change Plan
Expectations for relations,
especially concerned with
anticipated conflicts of interest,
the prospects of unity, and
potential trouble
Anticipated conflicts of interest
and future trouble are
counterbalanced by trust and
efforts at unity
Conflicts of interest (goals) and
little unity are expected, but no
future trouble is anticipated
because cash payment upon
instantaneous performance pre-
cludes future interdependence
Innovation Plan
Cooperative innovation,
especially joint efforts at
continuous performance
improvement and planning
Joint efforts related to both
performance and planning over
time; adjustment over time is
endemic
No joint efforts
Feedback Plan
Transferability; the ability to
transfer knowledge, obligations,
and satisfactions to other parties
over time
Limited transferability;
exchange is heavily dependent
on the identity of the parties
Complete transferability; it
matters not who fulfills
contractual obligation
Governance
Characteristics
Communication
Plan
Primary personal relations and
organizational reckoning of
exchange performance
Important personal, nonecono-
mic satisfactions derived; both
formal and informal communi-
cations are used
Minimal personal relationships;
ritual-like communications
predominate
Measurement
Charter
Measurement and specificity for
calculating and reckoning of
exchange performance
Significant attention to mea-
suring, specifying, and quanti-
fying all aspects of performance,
including psychic and future
benefits
Little attention to measurement
and specifications; performance
is obvious
Conflict
Arbitration
Balance of power that imposes
one’s will on others
Increased interdependence in-
creases the importance of judi-
cious applications of power in
the exchange
Power may be exercised when
promises are made until
promises are executed
Enforcement
Carrot-and-stick; division of
benefits and burdens (the extent
of sharing of benefits and
burdens)
Likely to include some sharing
of benefits and burdens and
adjustments to both shared and
parceled benefits and burdens
over time
Sharp division of benefits and
burdens into parcels; exclusive
allocation to parties
*Adapted from MacNeil (1980) and Dwyer et al. (1987)
